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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS INTO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
R ECENTLY there has been an alarm sounded by many lawyers,
as well as political figures, about the activities of Congres-
sional investigating committees. Many charges have been made
to the effect that some of our leaders are adopting totalitarian
tactics in order to combat Communist principles. Politicians from
the precinct level to the Presidency have said that personal free-
doms are being sacrificed to political hysteria. It is not the pur-
pose of this article to become involved in political quarrels or
partisan policies. The scope of this paper will be limited to an
evaluation of the constitutional authority of these committees as
viewed in the light of practical reality in the United States today.
For the purpose of clarity, the constitutional aspects of this
paper will be divided into several categories.
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES
The Constitution makes no express provision authorizing Con-
gress to investigate. But from the earliest days of the Colonial
States to the present time, the various legislatures have summoned
witnesses for the purpose of gathering factual data concerning
matters that they bad under consideration.' An early Supreme
Court case upholding the power of Congress to punish for con-
tempt was Anderson v. Dunn.2 Mr. Justice Johnson in that case
repudiated the contention that punishment of a witness for refusal
to appear and testify was purely a judicial function and, conse-
quently, a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.8 He
looked to the long established practice followed by legislative
1 Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation,
40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 159 (1926).
2 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821).
3 To the same effect see Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
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bodies and seemed to reason that the legislative function was
dependent upon ascertainment of facts and that as a matter of
practical necessity the power to investigate was indispensable. The
power was upheld again in 1897 in the historic case of In Re
Chapman.4 Many cases too numerous to mention have adopted
the same rule. It should be sufficient to point out that no case since
Anderson v. Dunn has repudiated the rule that Congress may
investigate and punish a witness for his refusal to appear and
answer questions in a proper inquiry. One writer summarized the
present state of the law when he stated that the existence of the
investigating power is "beyond dispute."'
2. LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE
(a) Limitation by the Scope of the Inquiry
The mere existence of this power does not necessarily mean that
it may enjoy unlimited effect. Leading cases have used language
to the effect that there are certain restrictions upon the inquiries
of investigating committees. The question now presented is the
effect that these expressions of limitation have upon the current
investigations into so-called un-American activities. The case of
Kilbourne v. Thompson6 uses this language:
We are sure that no person can be punished for contumacy as a wit-
ness before either house unless his testimony is required in a matter
into which that house has jurisdiction to inquire.
The court expressly rejected the theory that Congress has an un-
limited power of inquiry. In the case of McGrain v. Daugherty7
the general doctrine of the Kilbourne case was affirmed, and the
Court in defining the nature of Congress' implied powers said:
... [T]he two houses of Congress, in their separate relations, possess
not only such power as are expressly granted to them by the Constitu-
4 166 U. S. 661.
Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Governmental
Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 181, 214 (1948).
6103 U. S. 168, 190 (1880).
7273 U. S. 135, 173, 174 (1927). Emphasis added.
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tion, but such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to
make the express powers effective; ... neither house is invested with
"general" power to inquire into private affairs and compel dis-
closures....
Other words of limitation were employed by the Supreme Court
in the case of Sinclair v. United States:'
... [Flew if any of the rights of the people guarded by fundamental
law are of greater importance to their happiness and safety than the
right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable
inquiries and disclosures in respect of their personal and private affairs.
Thus, the court has said that the power to investigate is limited
to matters into which the Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.
What, however, are the limitations of this jurisdiction? This
writer can discover no case since the Kilbourne decision in which
the federal courts have held an investigation to have gone beyond
the boundaries which the decisions had established. There have
been recent court of appeals cases, Barsky v. United States9 and
United States v. Josephson,"0 which have held that Congress has
not exceeded the bounds of its power in its present investigation
of Communist activities. The Barsky case has stated that the exist-
ence of this investigation can be justified on the broad, general
provision in the Constitution that guarantees to the states a repub-
lican form of government. Thus, a logical conclusion can be drawn
that, in this connection at least, no actual legislation need be con-
templated or result in order to uphold the existence of these com-
mittees. The mere possibility of legislation seems to be sufficient.
A lower federal court has used this language:
If the subject matter under scrutiny may have any possible relevancy
and materiality, no matter how remote, to some possible legislation,
it is within the power of Congress to investigate the matter. Moreover,
the relevancy and materiality of the subject matter must be presumed. 1'
8 279 U. S. 263, 292 (1929). See also Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935).
9 167 F. 2d 241 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
10 165 F. 2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947).
11 United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D. D. C. 1947).
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It is submitted that if the rationale of these cases is followed,
then an inquiry into industry, churches, small businesses, munici-
pal corporations, etc., ad infinitum, would be equally justified. At
the date of this writing there have been already investigations
launched into some of these phases of American life. This liberal
construction of the power seems to mean that Congress, in effect,
has a right of investigation into private affairs that is limited by
qualifications not sufficiently defined to be observed in the prac-
tical operation of these committees. Any protection to the witness,
from this language, seems to be in name only.
It should be noted at this point that it would be entirely possible
for a validly created committee to ask questions which were beyond
the scope of the inquiry. It seems reasonable that each question is
governed by the same criteria that the courts have established
for the entire investigation. This possibility has been referred to
as a limitation of pertinence. 2 However, the limitation seems
incapable of offering any protection to the witness in light of the
broad, liberal interpretations the courts now place upon the inves-
tigating power of Congress. The cited article uses apt language
when it says "the so-called limitation of pertinence has been
reduced to almost complete insignificance."' 3
(b) Limitation by Personal Rights of Privacy
The above mentioned cases have held that the power to investi-
gate cannot be an arbitrary interference into private affairs. Is
there, then, a right of privacy, and, if so, what is its origin? The
McGrain case says that there is no general power to inquire into
private affairs. The Sinclair case states that men have a right to
be exempt from unauthorized and arbitrary inquiries into their
personal and private affairs. The case speaks in terms of funda-
mental law which protects this right. The case of Marshall v. Gor-
12 Nutting, supra note 5, at 215.
13 Id. at 216.
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don"4 states that a legislative body should be limited to an exertion
of "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." In
these cases it seems that the idea has been presupposed that man
has a right to be free from interference and investigation unless
there is some principle of public necessity that will override this
right. It is submitted that this right of privacy does not come from
a right to remain silent as a part of the right to freedom of speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The writer takes the position
that this constitutional provision was designed to insure man's
right to express his beliefs freely. From the long practice of com-
pelled disclosure in courts as well as before investigating bodies,
it seems that any right of silence, if such does exist, would readily
give way to the public need for information. This was the view
adopted by Mr. Justice Prettyman in the Barsky case when he
rejected the theory that a right of silence was embodied in the
First Amendment, which required a clear and present danger in
order to justify abridgment. 5
The right of privacy seems to be one of those inherent concepts
of the American way of life that the courts should recognize. It is
suggested here that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments should prevent the taking of this "liberty"
at the mere whim of Congress. The courts have already favored
such a result even though they have not pin-pointed and defined
the exact source of the freedom.
(c) Limitation by the First Amendment
The writer has reached the conclusion that no right of privacy
is protected by the First Amendment. This does not preclude the
possibility that the right of free speech imposes some limitations
upon the present investigations of un-American activities.
A contention is sometimes made that Congress has no right to
14 243 U. S. 521, 541 (1917), quoting from.Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231
(U. S. 1821).
15 167 F. 2d at 246.
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legislate in the area of free speech and, consequently, the investi-
gation of Communists or other political affiliations is invalid. In
the Josephson case 6 this contention was rejected. The court seemed
to take a broader view of the present investigations. The power to
investigate new and different political concepts seems to have been
established on the theory that Congress is entrusted with safe-
guarding the national security and may investigate any potential
source of danger.
A somewhat different side of the present situation was presented
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Edgerton in the Barsky case.'
He called attention to the comprehensive nature of the Smith Act,' s
which covers almost every type of subversive activity that can be
envisioned. Further, he pointed to the many statements made by
members of the House Un-American Activities Committee which
clearly demonstrated the total lack of any bona fide legislative
purpose. It may be well at this time to call attention to a few
sample statements that have been made.
This committee is the only agency of the Government that has the
power of exposure. ... There are many phases of un-American activi-
ties that cannot be reached by legislation or administrative action.1
The committee is empowered to explore and expose activities by un-
American individuals and organizations which, while sometimes being
legal, are nonetheless inimical to our American concepts and our
American future. 20
The country might as well be told first as last that our committee is in
this fight to expose un-American activities to the finish. 21
The purpose of this committee is the task of protecting our constitu-
tional democracy by... pitiless publicity.22
10 165 F. 2d at 90.
17 167 F. 2d at 277.
's62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. V, § 2385.
19 H. R. Rep. No. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1941).
20 H. R. Rep. No. 2742, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1947). Emphasis added.
21 Statement by Congressman Mundt, 92 Cong. Rec. 3767 (1946).
22 H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1, 3, 24 1940). Emphasis added.
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Many quotations, of a similar nature from both House and
Senate committees are readily available, but need not be repeated
here. It appears that committee members have expressed the view
that is commonly recognized in the United States today by the
average citizen: an assertion of the right to ferret out and expose
people believed to be guilty of some un-American point of view.
These committee members are frequently referred to as "spy
hunters." The patriotic motives of these Congressmen cannot be
questioned, for they are trying to concern themselves with what
they deem to be in the best interest of the nation as a whole.
Does Congress, however, have the right to take upon itself the
nature of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a federal grand
jury under the authority of an implied investigating power? From
the language cited in the basic decisions of Kilbourne v. Thomp.
son, McGrain v. Daugherty and United States v. Sinclair, supra,
it is the writer's conclusion that such a result is not justified and
that the courts should not construe the power as broadly as they
seem to have done in recent cases. Excessively broad construction
of the power would allow Congress to use the threat of trial by
newspaper to dictate or highly advance its particular concept of
Americanism. This borders closely upon an attempt at thought
control. That such an extension of power has no place in the
American scheme of things needs little comment; however, the
very significant language in the famous case of West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette may be quoted:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what should be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.2 3
This case stands as a monument to the proposition that men by
virtue of the First Amendment have a right to believe and speak
as they choose about the things mentioned in the decision. This
is one of our most fundamental rights, and it goes almost without
23319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943).
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saying that the founding fathers were greatly concerned that
minority opinions were to be protected from persecution. They
specifically stated in the First Amendment that Congress should
pass no law to abridge the right of free speech. The writer's
opinion is that a committee cannot abdicate its fact-finding func-
tion and embark upon a self-styled crusade to incite the wrath
of the majority against the views of a minority,2 as the statements
of committee members seem to indicate.
3. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE EXTENT OF ITS PROTECTION
TO WITNESSES BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
There are three distinct problems of current importance that
must be answered in a discussion of the protection afforded a wit-
ness by the Fifth Amendment: a. Does the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination extend to witnesses before Con-
gressional hearings? b. Does the use of the Fifth Amendment create
an inference of guilt? and c. May a witness refuse to answer a
question for any reason other than the stated reason of prevention
of self-incrimination?
(a) Availability of the Fifth Amendment to a Witness
before a Congressional Investigating Committee
The privilege against self-incrimination finds its derivation in
the early common law of England.25 It finds expression in the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.
It will be noted that the Fifth Amendment mentions only
"criminal cases" expressly. The question now under consideration
24 On the question of the authority of investigating committees to exist for the
purpose of publicizing events and disseminating information, see the following: (a)
against such authority-Note, 47 Col. L. Rev. 416, 425 (1947) ; Comment, 46 Mich. L.
Rev. 521, 526 (1948); Nutting, supra note 5, at 215; and (b) for such authority-
Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee-A Survey and Critique,
33 Col. L. Rev. 4 (1933).
25 8 WICMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2252 ns. 4, 5.
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is whether or not the protection of this privilege extends to hear-
ings of Congressional committees. In the case of Counselman v.
Hitchcock 6 the Supreme Court said:
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can
only be that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It doubtless covers
these cases, but is not limited to them.
The case of Grae v. Kennedy27 held that the privilege embodied
in the constitutional provision that no person shall be compelled
to testify against himself is not limited to criminal cases but ex-
tends to any proceeding where inquisition may expose a witness
to prosecution for a crime. The privilege has been extended to
the following situations: (1) federal grand jury investigations,
United States v. Monia,2s Blau v. United States; 9 (2) federal civil
proceedings, McCarthy v. A rndstein;80 and (3) legislative com-
mittee investigations, Blau v. United States, supra, United States
v. Fitzpatrick,81 Paretto v. United States,82 Arcado v. United
States,83 Marcello v. United States,84 United States v. Costello.85
In light of the authority just discussed, it must be concluded
that the protection of the Fifth Amendment is available to a wit-
ness while testifying before a committee of Congress.
(b) Inferences Arising out of the Use of the Fifth Amendment
Having determined that a witness is protected against self-
incrimination in his testimony before the committee, it remains
to be seen whether or not his invocation of the Fifth Amendment
implies guilt of some federal crime, or, restated, does the Fifth
26 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
27282 N. Y. 428, 26 N. E. 2d 963 (1940).
28 317 U. S. 424 (1943).
29340 U. S. 159 (1950).
30 266 U. S. 34 (1924).
3'96 F. Supp. 491 (D. D. C. 1951).
22 196 F. 2d 392 (5th Cir. 1952).
33 196 F. 2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1952).
34 196 F. 2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).
25 198 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 874 (1952).
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Amendment extend its protection to the innocent as well as to the
guilty, so as to dispel any such inference?
That the latter is the rule is seemingly axiomatic; for a con-
trary holding to the effect that the Fifth Amendment was designed
to protect only the guilty would say that only a guilty party could
properly invoke the Fifth Amendment. Thus, when a witness
invoked the privilege, it would be positively concluded that he was
guilty of one of two offenses: (1) the criminal act which his tes-
timony would tend to reveal; or (2) contempt of court, or Con-
gress, as the case might be. The founders of the Constitution did
not envision a system which would put the witness in such a di-
lemma. The clause was entended to protect all witnesses, and its
invocation gives rise to no presumption of guilt.86
In Bradford v. United States3 7 the court stated:
No presumption against the accused arose from his not testifying in
his own behalf, but his failure to testify did not raise a presumption
in his favor or enable him to avoid the consequences of fair and rea-
sonable inferences from proven facts.
In other words, the invocation of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination gives rise to no inference or presumption of
guilt. It merely prevents consideration of the testimony which the
witness might otherwise have given.
(c) Proper Uses of the Fifth Amendment
At times witnesses have attempted to invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment for other purposes than that of prevention of personal self-
incrimination. The Supreme Court has expressly held in Rogers
v. United States"s that the privilege is personal to the witness and
36 Billeci v. U. S., 184 F. 2d 394 (D. C. Cir. 1950); Zager v. U. S., 84 F. 2d 1023
(4th Cir. 1936) ; Paxton v. State, 114 Ark. 393, 170 S. W. 80 (1914) ; Ferguson v. State,
52 Neb. 432, 72 N. W. 590 (1897) ; Lambert v. State, 197 Md. 22, 78 A. 2d 378 (1951);
Powell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S. E. 433 (1937).
3 129 F. 2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1942).
38 340 U. S. 367 (1951).
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exercisable only on his behalf. The case clearly stands for the
proposition that the privilege cannot be used to protect others from
incrimination. An extremely important consideration at the pres-
ent time is whether or not a witness may refuse to answer if he
is denied the opportunity to explain fully the inferences that might
arise from a categorical "yes" or "no" reply. In other words, may
a witness invoke the Fifth Amendment to protect himself from
disclosing incriminating facts.
The problem is highlighted by a case in which a federal district
court held that a witness had the right of explanation and must
be allowed a reasonable opportunity to clarify his answers.89 The
court of appeals reversed the decision on broad grounds, 0 and the
precise question has never been passed upon. Although the reason
for the rule announced by the district court is not too clear, it
seems to this writer that an explanation of the Fifth Amendment
and the protection that it was designed to produce can only lead
to a result contrary to that reached by the court of appeals.
The opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Rosario
St. Pierre4 sheds a great deal of light on this inquiry. The opinion
reads, in part, as follows:
Whatever may have been the original limits of the privilege [against
self-incrimination] .. ., since Counselman v. Hitchcock ... it is settled
in federal courts that a witness cannot be compelled to disclose any-
thing that will "tend" to incriminate him, whether or not the answer
would be an admission of one of the constitutive elements of the crime.
The court thus adopted a broad view as to matters which fall
within the purview of the Fifth Amendment. At the same time, it
placed a stern limitation on the power of an investigating body,
be it judicial or legislative, to compel a witness to disclose certain
facts, even though such disclosure would not amount to an unveil-
ing of a constitutive part of a criminal act. In other words, the
39 Cole v. Loew's Inc., 8 F. R. D. 508 (S. D. Cal. 1948).
40 185 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950).
41 132 F. 2d 837, 838 (2d Cir. 1942).
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court included within the purview of the Fifth Amendment any
testimony which would tend to establish a circumstantial chain
of evidence against the witness.
The question arises whether the rationale of the Rosario case
would embrace a claim of self-incrimination based on the type
of questioning leveled at the witness, particularly in a Congres-
sional investigation in which the witness does not have a right to
counsel, to cross-examination, etc. It is submitted that under the
criteria expressed in the above opinion, a witness may be justi-
fied in invoking the Fifth Amendment on the grounds that the
questions were framed in such a manner, and his answers limited
by the investigating body in such a way, as to tend to establish
incriminating circumstantial evidence against him.
If the language employed by Judge Hand leaves any doubt as
to this proposition, the rule of construction consistently applied
by the courts to the Fifth Amendment and all other amendments
which guarantee freedoms to the individual dispels all doubt. The
decisions establish the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of persons and property should be liberally construed. 2
For a clear illustration let us turn to the case of Gouled v. United
States"5 where the Supreme Court in considering the nature of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments stated:
It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which the framers
of our Constitution and this court [citing cases] have declared the
importance to political liberty and to the welfare of our country of the
due observance of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by
these two Amendments. The effect of decisions cited is: that such
rights are declared to be indispensable to the "full enjoyment of per-
sonal security, personal liberty, and private property;" that they are
to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and
that the guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as are the
42 Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71
(1920); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) ; Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 161
(1886); Powell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S. E. 433 (1937).
43255 U.S. 298, 302, 303 (1921).
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guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen,-
the right to trial by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus, and to due
process of law. It has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments
should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroach-
ment upon or "gradual depreciation" of the rights secured by them,
by imperceptible practice or by well intentioned but mistakenly over-
zealous executive officers.
And in Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, the Supreme Court stated:
This provision [against self-incrimination] must have a broad con-
struction in favor of the right which it was intended to secure.4
Giving the Fifth Amendment the broad construction which it is
thus due, it must be concluded that a witness cannot be compelled
to testify if the testimony is in a form which, on its face, is mis-
leading and incomplete and would furnish a link in a chain of
incriminating circumstantial evidence against him.
Bill E. Brice.
44 142 U. S. at 562.
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